Sybilla Oritur

Keegan, John. The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship. London: Pimlico, 1987, 2004. 358pgs.

In my last year of high school, Mr. Goodman, my world history teacher, organized a formal debate lasting a fortnight in order to assess which countries were most responsible for the outbreak of WWI. Were it not for that experience and Keegan’s The First World War, i would probably not be where i am today. I’ve since moved away from military history as a field of study, focusing more on political theory and transgression in the late medieval era, but it remains a passion of mine. So, when Arieh offered to lend me a copy of Mask of Command i couldn’t pass it up.

Keegan, for all of his being one of the world’s foremost military historians, suffers from what i dub “Harold Bloom” syndrome: He rewrites essentially the same books over and over again. That said, this specimen is fantastic. Using the example of four extraordinary generals, Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant and Hitler, he analyzes their differing styles of leadership and command. Keegan offers a framework for comparison as he goes along arguing that the key question for ANY general, not just these four, is the extent to which they must share the danger with their troops. While each individual chapter provides a well-written, informative and insightful account of the particularities of situation and style of each general, the conclusion ties it all together very nicely. I learnt a lot from this book and think it is a great example of non-fiction palatable to both academic and amateur alike.

That said, there are a few problems with the book that caused me to groan. Firstly, it definitely suffers from a euro-centrism that undermines Keegan’s authority. Only because this IS Keegan writing am i willing to trust his assertions without the formidable footnotes i would demand of any other writer. I have lost the quotations to back up this criticism, but i remember it was particularly prominent in the section about Wellington’s background in India.

Lastly, the conclusion is divided into sections, each addressing different “imperatives” of command and providing a brief synopsis of how context, character and technology played out the success or failure of each general: Kinship, Prescription, Sanction, Action and Example. This conception of human history as teleological, i frankly can’t agree with (see Eurocentrism criticism above). Furthermore, the argument borders on the ridiculous when the culminating section is a “validation of nuclear authority.” Yes, i realize that, in 1987, nuclear war was still a very real threat as Keegan wrote. However, today, we are not nearly as occupied by nuclear warfare as by biological warfare and acts of terrorism committed by groups of individuals rather than armies. Mask of Command provides a very dated account of contemporary military leadership - but that doesn’t in the least take away from its analysis of generalship in the past.

It took me over a month to slug through, but it was mostly the Hitler section that i had trouble with - not because it was poorly written but because it is difficult to get excited by a tale of defeat. Grant was an interesting choice for study - as numerous heated arguments about whether Lee or Grant was the better general have evidenced. I recommend this as a heavier read to just about everyone.

Oh, and i have decided that i will name my first four children Alexander, Peter, Catherine and William (he’ll be the artist as its a reference to both William the Conqueror and William Shakespeare).

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